

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE
ENDC/PV.25
20 April 1962
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 15 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 20 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ATTA

(Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. T. VALLADAO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K.K. RAO
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSCOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. el-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. R.I. SPIERS
Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the twenty-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I thought it might be helpful if at the beginning of the discussions this morning I reported to the Conference my own feelings in regard to the developments of yesterday. Following on our plenary meeting yesterday morning, a meeting of the Sub-Committee was held to explore further the discussions we had had yesterday morning and to see if we could make further immediate progress in regard to the achievement of a test ban treaty. I think it was my suggestion yesterday morning that we should have a meeting of the Sub-Committee yesterday afternoon. I made that suggestion after listening to the comments that had been made, and particularly after listening to the statement by the Soviet representative. As I listened to that statement and in particular as I noted the importance which the Soviet representative sought to give to it, I thought that it represented a new position on the part of his Government. It was for that reason that I proposed a meeting of the Sub-Committee. I was looking then, as I am looking now, for genuine means of reaching agreement.

Yesterday morning I understood the Soviet representative to attach great importance to his statement that his Government accepted the eight-Power memorandum as "a basis for further negotiation". He asked the two Western Powers concerned whether they also accepted it in that way. He attached great importance, in the morning meeting and especially in the afternoon meeting, to this particular point. He attached so much importance to it that I began to wonder why. I do not think this is something which one needs to make heavy weather about at all. I am on record at yesterday morning's meeting as having said, when I followed the Soviet representative:

"I am perfectly willing to continue those negotiations using as a basis these proposals which have been put forward -- assuming that the principles to which I have referred this morning are accepted".

(ENDC/PV.24, page 13)

I went on to talk about those principles, but I said straight away that I was willing to accept the memorandum as a basis. I am so willing: I have been willing all along.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Again, in my first intervention yesterday afternoon, I said:

"We ourselves are, of course, ready to discuss in this Sub-Committee the important proposition of the eight non-aligned countries. We are anxious to do so". (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 4)

A little later on I said:

"Of course we are willing to discuss it; of course we are anxious to discuss it". (ibid.)

That was the position, and it needed no reinforcement, because I went on to discuss the memorandum; it was used as the basis of our discussion yesterday afternoon. Of course we are willing to discuss it. Of course we are willing to use it as a basis of our discussions. But we have to be quite clear on this: it cannot be exclusive. It is a valuable new proposal which contain some most interesting propositions, but it cannot be an exclusive basis for our discussions. It was never so intended, as I understand it, by the eight countries which put it forward. If anyone has any doubt on this he has only to refer to paragraph 6 of the memorandum, which is abundantly clear. The last sentence says that the countries concerned

"urge the nuclear Powers earnestly to consider the suggestions put forward above, as well as other possible suggestions ..." (ENDC/28, page 2)

That is the wording. There is no intention that it should be exclusive.

One cannot help wondering why there is this tremendous emphasis on it. Anyhow, there is no need to have the emphasis, because I give my Soviet colleague the assurance this morning, as I did yesterday on two different occasions, in two different meetings, that I am only too happy and willing to discuss this memorandum and to continue to do so. So that has been accepted, and there is no difficulty whatever about it, so long as it is clearly understood that the memorandum is not in any way exclusive.

What I was concerned about, myself, was to find out clearly whether in fact the Soviet Union had moved forward in its position, because that seem to be the implication in what our Soviet colleague said to us yesterday morning. I tried yesterday afternoon in no less than three interventions, I think, to put simple, straightforward questions to our Soviet colleague. I listened with the greatest care to his answers, and in none of them did I find any real clarification, such as I was looking for. There was in fact a complete refusal to elucidate.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Now I do not want to put this too high; but really, we are not here to indulge in an exercise of semantics. Certainly it is not my purpose here, and I hope it is not the purpose of others, to see who is the cleverest at misleading the non-aligned States here. It is my purpose, and I am sure that of my United States colleague too, to have honest discussion in an honest desire to make progress. That is what I have been trying all the time to do: that is what I shall continue to try to do.

I have made it quite clear from the start that I welcome the proposals of the neutral States; I have made it clear that I see certain elements in them which are of real value; but equally I have made it clear --- and I think there is no dispute about this --- that I do not think those proposals go far enough. Speaking entirely for my own delegation and Government, I would say that if we are to make progress one thing is absolutely necessary; that every party to the treaty should accept--- nay, must accept --- the principle of the undisputed right of on-site inspection of at least a quota of suspicious events. This has been fundamental to the United Kingdom position from the moment we assembled here, and I think that has been made abundantly clear, time and again. That was why, right from the start, I did query this particular position in the proposals of the neutral States. I thought from our earliest meetings here that it really had been accepted that there must be some effective way of settling a dispute as to whether in fact a nuclear event had taken place or not.

I think my senior colleague, Lord Home, brought this out most dramatically when he was here during our earlier discussions. I see from the verbatim record of the meeting on 23 March that Lord Home called attention to the difficulty of settling a dispute as to facts. He referred in a rather telling phrase to the dispute as to whether there had been --- as he put it --- "metal chaff dropped from aeroplanes" in the Berlin air corridors. He went on to say:

"Now, this is a fact that somebody ought to go and decide upon, to say whether I am a liar or he [Mr. Gromyko] is mistaken." (ENDC/PV.8, page 30) I am sure my colleagues will remember that intervention. Lord Home went on to say -

"We do not want espionage in the Soviet Union. We do not want anybody to go and spy. I cannot believe that Mr. Gromyko is really saying that unaligned States ... are necessarily spies and necessarily not impartial." (ibid., page 31)

He went on to develop this argument.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The point is that we have made it clear from the beginning of these discussions that this is an essential factor for us. As I understood it, this was clearly and emphatically rejected by our Soviet colleague on 16 April when he read into the record Chairman Khrushchev's reply to my own Prime Minister (ENDC/PV.21, pages 8 et seq.) It was that fact that made me so insistent yesterday on seeking elucidation. On Monday we had had this important statement, in the words of Chairman Khrushchev himself, which seemed utterly to reject the principle of on-site inspection. Then yesterday we had this statement from our Soviet colleague, in which, in his references to the proposals of the non-aligned States, he appeared to imply that he accepted the principle of on-site inspection. These two positions seemed to me to be incompatible, and that was why I sought elucidation.

Of course, subsequently I have had the opportunity of seeing the actual text of the Soviet statement (ENDC/32). It does not dissipate my fears; it increases them. Any why does it increase them? It increases them because, on page 3 of the English text of this Soviet statement which was circulated to us yesterday, there is a clear reference to Chairman Khrushchev's reply to my Prime Minister of 12 April. Indeed, it supports and develops that reply. So, as I say, we have two incompatible positions. In one statement the Soviet Union confirms absolutely, up to the hilt, that there can be no question of on-site inspections and yet, in the same statement, the Soviet Union seems to take the position that it is accepting as a basis for discussion the principles embodied in the eight-Power memorandum.

This is not dealing fairly, honestly and squarely with our Conference, and we should recognize that fact. Where there is straight dealing, where there is honesty, where there is willingness to show exactly where we stand, we can make progress. But if in the same statement people say two diametrically-opposed things, then I believe it is very difficult to make progress. As I said yesterday morning, I honestly thought we had a new approach from our Soviet colleagues. I thought we had seen a change in attitude. It can be argued, of course, in the light of that statement, that there are certain things which our Soviet colleagues are willing to consider. It can be argued that they are willing to consider the principle of an international organization. I am not denying that for one moment. But what I am saying is that, as far as my Government is concerned, on the fundamental, basic question we have not progressed at all.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

My own Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons only yesterday, in reply to questions made a statement which I think shows our position clearly. He said:

"The position now is that if the neutrals' proposals provide for effective measures of international verification and if the Russians, even at this late stage, agree to this, negotiation will become possible."

When he was asked again to clarify just what the neutrals' proposals were, he said:

"As I understand it, the proposals would not make verification compulsory; it would be only permissive. But if it is to be only permissive we are really back where we stood before. The question is: is it to be compulsory or permissive? If the point were granted by the Russians -- and we have made this point over and over again -- the whole situation would be changed. It is that point which once more we have thought it our duty to put forward. Failing to do that, I do not think that a fruitful negotiation can now be embarked on."

This is the key to it all. I can understand that our Soviet colleagues could say that they accepted this memorandum as a basis; yet, if they are genuine and if in fact they want to make progress, then, in the words of the draft of the eight Powers, they have to accept this obligation which refers to on-site inspection. Admittedly the draft is so framed that it can be interpreted in many ways. I can understand that this was done in an endeavour to find some way between the two parties. But if one party says, "We accept this as a basis for discussion", and at the same time says, "This whole concept of inspection is something we utterly reject", then it is not being clear and straightforward. That was what I was seeking to find out yesterday afternoon. It was on that point that I was seeking some further elucidation from our Soviet colleagues to indicate that they did accept this principle of on-site inspection. If they were even to accept it within the control and discretion of the control organization, that might take us somewhere. But when I read through their statements once more I do not find reason for encouragement; and when I ask questions and they are not answered, then I am bound to come to the conclusion that we do not have this basis for progress that I would hope for.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

So I say to our Soviet colleagues once more that we are willing, anxious and ready to discuss this document -- to try to build on it, yes -- but not to accept it in its present form as an exclusive basis for our discussions. That is the point, and it is essential for me to make that point, because in the previous three-Power talks we were faced time and time and time again with the Soviet representatives saying that they were discussing on the basis of the experts' report of 1958 and they would discuss nothing that fell outside the basis of that report. Therefore, if they are seeking now to narrow our discussions to their own interpretation of this eight-Power document, that will not help us. I will not weary the Committee with quotations from our long discussions in the three-Power Conference, but the fact is abundantly clear that the Soviet Union, once it had got discussion on the basis of the experts' report, (EXP/NUC/28) was unwilling to discuss anything that fell outside it. Therefore there is significance in this; and therefore I repeat, certainly we will discuss this document; certainly we will use it as one of the bases of our discussions; but beyond that I am not prepared to go.

I am afraid I have been somewhat long in developing this, but I think it is right that people should know precisely where my Government stands on this matter and I think it is right that we should know precisely what is the position of the other countries concerned.

I have said nothing this morning about the question of a moratorium on tests at the present time. I think I can deal with that very shortly. I must say frankly to my colleagues that, if we cannot reach agreement here, this does not mean that we stop talking. We have to keep on trying to find means of making progress. If one side tests, we are told, the other will. But we cannot ourselves accept, nor can we ask our United States colleagues to accept, another moratorium now, in the light of what has gone before. Some of those nations sitting around this table may have the right to criticise us in this regard, but there is one nation that has no such right, and that is the Soviet Union. As I said in the Sub-Committee the other day, it is they and they alone who have debased the coinage of this particular measure. It is they, by their action last September, we have made it impossible for us to do anything more in that regard. I do not propose to refer to this further, because I do not think it helps; but, as the question has been raised, I think it important that the position of my Government should be abundantly clear.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I conclude by saying that, though I genuinely hoped and thought yesterday morning we had a move forward -- indeed further discussion may show we have, and I hope it will -- I am bound at the moment to feel that this was not a move forward; it was, it seems to me, an attempt to confuse our discussions rather than to clarify them. I am not going to indulge in that sort of manœuvre. I have tried to explain explicitly where I stand in this regard. I hope the other parties concerned will do the same and I hope that we can still go back and discuss this document and others in an attempt to come to agreement. My delegation is willing, ready and anxious to continue discussion of this and other documents in this regard. It is our desire to make progress, and I am only sorry that we do not have a more hopeful report on our deliberations yesterday afternoon.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

After the Soviet delegation, on the instructions of its Government, had submitted for consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the Soviet Government's statement in connexion with the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28), the Committee decided to call a meeting of the three-Power Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee was entrusted with the task of studying the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned States in order to try and find a common basis for further negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

The meeting of the Sub-Committee was held yesterday afternoon. During that meeting the Soviet delegation made the greatest effort to explain its position to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, to assess the situation which has arisen, and to discover ways and means of bringing about a speedy positive solution of the question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests.

Today, since that meeting, the United Kingdom representative has presented an assessment of what happened yesterday in the Sub-Committee and expressed his dissatisfaction at the way in which we reacted to the questions put by his delegation and the United States delegation in the course of the discussions in the Sub-Committee.

Mr. Godber spoke today about his having had doubts yesterday -- and, as far as one could make out, he still has them today -- whether the Soviet Government

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

has really taken up a new position in regard to the basis for further negotiations in the Sub-Committee. He stated that he had not received an answer to this question or to other questions which he had put during the meeting of the Sub-Committee.

I am surprised at this assessment of the results of yesterday's meeting. I am surprised because everyone who reads objectively the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting cannot fail to notice that I gave a sufficiently clear answer to this fundamental question which was asked by the United Kingdom representative.

I should like to quote what I said yesterday at the meeting of the Sub-Committee:

"First of all, ... the last remark by the United Kingdom representative ... completely bewilders our delegation." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.9, page 23).

I apologize to the members of the Committee for quoting a fairly large part of the statement I made yesterday, but this is absolutely necessary for an objective consideration of what was said yesterday by the United Kingdom representative. I also do this on the assumption that the members of the Committee may not have had an opportunity this morning, on receiving the verbatim record, to make a careful study of it. I shall therefore quote a fairly large part of the statement I made yesterday:

"In reply to the questions put by the United Kingdom representative, I gave an absolutely clear account of the Soviet Union's position on the question of further negotiations. I pointed out that, before the non-aligned countries submitted their proposals, each side had adhered to its position as set out in the relevant documents. The position of the Soviet Union was clearly expressed in the document of 28 November 1961, and that of the United States and the United Kingdom was expressed in the draft treaty the final version of which was submitted on 18 April 1961.

It has proved impossible to reach agreement on the basis of these documents. It was this impasse that caused the eight non-aligned States to submit on 16 April their compromise proposal for consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It is this compromise document which we agree to take as a basis for our further negotiations with the specific purpose of finding a way out of the impasse.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I have made this point sufficiently clear and, as I have said, it leads to the conclusion that this is a new Soviet position adopted as a result of the submission of the proposal of the eight non-aligned States, which is a compromise proposal. What more do you want? (ENDC/SC.1/PV.9, p. 23)

I asked that question. And, in fact, is it not clearly stated here that this is a new position of the Soviet Union in connexion with the new proposal submitted by the non-aligned States? I think it is clear to everyone that this proposal of the non-aligned States is neither a proposal of the Soviet Union nor a proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom. It is a compromise proposal which takes into account to some extent the position of the Soviet Union and the position of the United States. But it is a new proposal and a new position. And we propose that this new position should be taken as a basis for our negotiations. Is this not a new position of the Soviet Union? Of course it is. No one can deny this; and therefore I think it is absolutely superfluous to reply to any additional questions, which are being put now and were put yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom.

I dealt with this question in the statement I made yesterday. I said:

"What more do you want? Do you want me to tell you what will be acceptable or unacceptable to us in the proposals of 16 April?" (ibid). Of course the proposals of 16 April are wholly acceptable to us.

"whether there will be on-site inspection or not, and in what form? This, however, is a matter for negotiation on the basis which has just been proposed to us and which we have accepted." (ibid).

In order to explain this position, I should now like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the compromise proposal contained in the Joint Memorandum of the eight States (ENDC/25).

Paragraph 4 states:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"...parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." (ENDC/28, p.2)

We propose that this document should be taken as a basis for our negotiations. But this means that we propose that paragraph 1, paragraph 2, paragraph 3, and paragraph 4 which I have just read out, should be taken as a basis for the negotiations. Consequently, we are prepared to discuss the possibility mentioned in paragraph 4 regarding inspection.

Paragraph 5 states:

"The party and the Commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment. The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ibid).

It says "in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above". I have just quoted this obligation in paragraph 4. This obligation says "the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories". In accordance with this obligation we are prepared to accept also paragraph 5 as a basis for our negotiations.

What, then, is not clear to you? In the text of our statement, which has been before you since yesterday, it is said:

"The Joint Memorandum suggests that control of the discontinuance of nuclear tests should be carried out by means of national networks of observation posts, that for the selection and processing of the data obtained at these posts it is sufficient to set up an International Commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and that the question of inviting the Commission for the purpose of verifying in loco the circumstances of the occurrence of any particular suspicious events should be decided by the States themselves." (ENDC/32, p.4).

What, then, is not clear to you? We are prepared to take as a basis for our negotiations the proposals formulated in the paragraphs of the Joint Memorandum, including paragraphs 4 and 5 concerning on-site inspection. Why, then, do you now put to us the question of our attitude towards on-site inspection and so forth?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We answer that our attitude is in accordance with what is formulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Joint Memorandum. And as it is mentioned in the statement by the Soviet Government which I read out to you yesterday. Therefore any further clarification of these questions relates to another field: that of drafting the text of an agreement. That is the point. And I said so yesterday to the United States and United Kingdom representatives. I went on to say:

"Before you adopt a position on the document which has been submitted, not by us but by eight other States, you for some reason wish to know the details of our position, which can be formulated only in the course of specific negotiations on the agreement. But you do not answer the fundamental question: do you accept this document as a basis or not? You want to know not only our answer to this question -- we have already given you a perfectly clear answer to it and told you that we accept this document as a basis for our negotiations -- but you want to know already which paragraphs in a future agreement we accept and which we reject. Is this really a serious basis for our discussions at the present time?

"The basic question is whether we can make this document as drawn up by the eight nations a basis for our negotiations. Our reply is that we can. I have not heard your reply. You are trying to avoid giving a reply to this fundamental question." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.9, pp.23-24).

That is what I said yesterday, and these are the explanations which I am giving today.

What, then, is not clear to you? It seems to me that our position is abundantly clear. It was clear yesterday and it is clear today. Your position was not clear yesterday and it is not altogether clear today.

I wish to draw your attention to what the United Kingdom representative said today. Referring to the document submitted by the eight non-aligned States, he asked himself: "Are we accepting this document as a basis?" and he answered: "As one of the bases, we accept it. We are willing to discuss this document. We are willing to use it as one of the bases. But it cannot be the exclusive, only document." He went on to say that there may also be other documents and proposals.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I must first of all make more precise the question which we asked and which the United Kingdom representative is now trying to answer.

Have we said that this is an exclusive document? Have we asked you whether you accept this document as an exclusive document, as the only one and nothing else? No. We did not put the question like that, we put it in a much more general form. We asked whether you accepted this document as a basis for our negotiations.

What does that mean? It means that our main talks should turn, first of all, round this document. Can any other questions be raised? Of course, any questions may be raised in the course of the negotiations. It is perfectly clear. May any other proposals be submitted in the future? Of course they may. May old documents which have already been submitted be used? Of course they may. But, in order to carry on the negotiations effectively, we must have some document as a starting point. That is the point. And we propose to you that we take this document as the starting point and as the basis for all future discussion on this question. Why? Because this document is a compromise document, and it has been specially adapted to create such a basis for our future negotiations, taking into consideration that the documents submitted previously could not become a basis for agreement.

But, in replying to this question, you first of all interpret it incorrectly and say that we propose that this document should be adopted as an exclusive one. We have not said this; nor does it follow from our position or from the question which we put to you.

Secondly, you say, and you have said so today, that not everything in this document goes "far enough". That is something that must be clarified. What is it that does not go far enough? What is it in this document that does not suit you? We would ask you to give us an explanation. This is apparently the reason why you are reluctant to accept this document as the basis for our further negotiations. For some reason it does not suit you even as a basis for negotiations. But what is there in it that does not suit you? What does not go far enough? I suspect that "far enough" refers precisely to what is contained in your document and upon which you are insisting even now. You want compulsory inspection at whatever places you wish to have it. That is probably what you want. That is not in the Joint Memorandum, and that is why it does not suit you.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But if you desire a compromise and to create a basis for agreement, you cannot take your extreme position and demand that we accept it. We have told you so, and this is also mentioned in the statement by Mr. Khrushchev -- which I quoted and which you have -- which says that we do not and shall not accept this position of yours on inspection. But we accept as a basis the position which is set forth in this document of the non-aligned States. Now give us your answer: are you or are you not prepared to accept this position on all questions including that of inspection? Tell us. We say that we are prepared to accept this position as a basis. But are you prepared to do so or not?

In order to carry on businesslike talks, and to ensure the success of our negotiations, you must adopt a more flexible position than at present. But you want us to adopt a flexible position while you adopt a rigid position. Is that what you want? On that basis, however, it is impossible to reach agreement. We will not accept your Diktat. I said this yesterday; we had, so to speak, a somewhat heightened temperature. To-day we are trying to speak as calmly as possible, and I think that the representatives of other countries, too, are concerned that our discussions should be calm. We are concerned to reach agreement, and therefore adopt a flexible position. We are now taking a compromise position. We are taking a new position. But you are still keeping to your old position. You want us to accept your old position.

But nothing, of course, will come of this. In this regard the utmost clarity is necessary. And when you say, Mr. Godber, as you have said today, that this is not dealing fairly, honestly and squarely, we say: "No, we beg to differ". From what I have said and from what I have read out from the documents all the representatives, I think, understand that our position is a fair and honest one. But our position is also flexible. It shows that we are not tied to old formulae but are seeking new ones which could provide a basis for agreement.

Now the question is bound to arise: what is the position that you are taking? You keep repeating the old themes. You are taking your old inflexible position and want us to move over to it. We cannot do this. We have told you so before. And we tell you so now.

But we are prepared to move over to the new compromise position, if, of course, you do likewise. But if you do not move over, if you stick to your old position, what basis will there be then for negotiations? What practical basis for

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

negotiations can there be then? You are sufficiently experienced statesmen. You should understand that if you want agreement, it can only be on a new basis and not on your old one.

That is why Mr. Godber's reply today is clearly inadequate, although I cannot fail to note that the past night has had some beneficial influence, so that there seems to be a glimpse of some movement forward. But I am still afraid to define this with sufficient clearness, because there has been no clear answer from Mr. Godber. He has taken a very small step forward under the influence of the whole circumstances and the discussion which took place twice yesterday. And now he has already, you see, begun to say: "We are willing to accept this as one of the bases". But what does this mean? What other basis can there be? If this is your basis, then nothing will come of it. Nothing will come of the negotiations. And everybody, I think, must realize this objectively. If you persist in your old position, there can be no agreement.

That is the situation. I think it is clear to everyone. We have a flexible position; we have taken it in connexion with the new Joint Memorandum which has been submitted and which expresses a new compromise approach. But you want to cling to your old position; you do not want to take up a new compromise position. You continue to adhere to your old position, which cannot lead to agreement.

The question now arises, why you are maintaining that attitude. Why? If you want agreement, you should realize that there will be no agreement on the basis of the old attitude. Consequently one must conclude that you evidently do not want agreement, because if you wanted agreement you would take a more flexible attitude. Since you take the old unyielding attitude, it means you do not want agreement. That is the inevitable conclusion. We wish you would adopt a more flexible, I would say reasonable, attitude in the interests of peace and the complete discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

If you really want to reach agreement on the discontinuance of all tests, take a more reasonable and flexible attitude, take into account the proposals which have now been submitted by the eight non-aligned States, and take these proposals as a basis for negotiations; then we shall reach agreement on this important and urgent question. We do not understand why you cannot take these proposals as a basis for our future negotiations. Explain to us, explain to the

(Mr. Lorin, USSE)

whole Conference, why you cannot take this document as a basis for discussion. There are not many details in this document, because it is not intended as a draft agreement. It is intended to provide a basis on which we will attempt to draft an agreement. That is the purpose of the document, as we understand it. I do not know -- perhaps the representatives of the countries which signed this document will explain -- whether we understand the position of these countries correctly; but it seemed to us that the countries put forward these draft proposals as a possible basis for further negotiations so that agreement could be reached.

They sought a compromise. They formulated this comprise. They propose it to us. We accept this compromise, and naturally the question arises whether the Western Powers accept this compromise or not. If they do not accept this compromise, it means they are adhering to their old position. When they adhere to their old position, there can be no agreement, because the experience of all recent negotiations has clearly demonstrated that there can be no agreement on that basis. That was realized by all who signed this document. If you are willing to accept this compromise, we shall be very glad. This will mean that there is a serious basis for future agreement, and it is our profound conviction that such an agreement could be reached in a very short time. The possibility of reaching agreement now depends upon your attitude.

The second question touched upon by the United Kingdom representative today concerns the forthcoming nuclear weapon explosions. What he told us today cannot fail to cause grave concern to us and, I think, to all the representatives in this Committee, and indeed to all those who are interested in consolidating peace in general. From the answer given to this question yesterday and today it follows, unfortunately, that the United States and United Kingdom Governments are not taking account of the new situation, which affords an opportunity to reach agreement on the discontinuance of all tests on a mutually-acceptable basis in a very short time. The United Kingdom Government, as can be seen from today's statement, continues to adhere to its old policy despite the new situation. This policy cannot but lead to exceedingly grave consequences for the solution of the questions connected with the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the disarmament negotiations, and the whole cause of consolidating peace.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

If you resume nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere now, you will create an exceedingly tense international situation fraught with grave consequences for the whole course of our future steps in disarmament, the discontinuance of tests, and relations among States in general. I think this must be clear to everyone, and one can only regret that the United Kingdom Government is now taking such a negative attitude in this matter despite the demands of world public opinion and of all the States in the world, and the clearly-expressed will of the States participating in the Eighteen Nation Committee. You are jeopardizing both the negotiations on the discontinuance of tests and the negotiations on disarmament. No one will forgive you if you bring about the failure of these negotiations. I would ask the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to reflect again and again on the consequences of their old policy, which they do not want to change and which is leading to a new nuclear arms race and to an extremely serious aggravation of the whole international situation.

We should not like the matter to lead to the failure of our negotiations; but that is what it may come to, if you persist in adhering to your old policy. We should like to hope that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will take due account of all that has been said in our Committee and of the feelings of millions of people on this question, and will bear in mind the new circumstances connected with the submission of the compromise proposal by the eight non-aligned States, and with the acceptance by the Soviet Union of this compromise proposal as a basis for future negotiations.

I should like to end my statement today by reminding you again of what was said in yesterday's statement by the Soviet Government:

"The next few days must show the turn events are to take --- whether towards an agreement to end nuclear weapon tests or towards further nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This depends entirely on the Governments of the United States and its allies. The Western Powers now have an opportunity to demonstrate in practice that they will not obstruct the settlement of the urgent problem of ending tests. The peoples of the world will never forgive them if this opportunity is missed" (ENDC/32, p.5).

(Mr. Borin, USSR)

The Soviet Government has provided this opportunity to conclude an agreement on a compromise basis. If you do not accept this new position of the Soviet Union, you will bear the entire responsibility for the consequences.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest interest to the statements made this morning by the United Kingdom representative and the Soviet representative. Yesterday morning the Soviet delegation presented a statement by the Soviet Government in which it is said:

"... The Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set out in the Memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations." (ENDC/32, page 4)

The Soviet Government goes on to say:

"... Fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests cannot be conducted to the thunder of nuclear explosions". (ibid.)

It proposes that the nuclear Powers "give a voluntary undertaking not to set off nuclear explosions while the negotiations are in progress". (ibid.)

The Soviet representative later put two questions to my delegation. The first question was whether the United States accepted the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for further negotiations. The United States is quite prepared to accept the eight-nation memorandum --- indeed, we welcome it --- as one of the bases for negotiation, but not as an exclusive basis for negotiation. The United States is fully prepared to explore in further negotiations the possibilities which the eight-nation memorandum presents for agreement, and to do this on an urgent basis. We hope the Soviet Union does not mean that it will continue to seek a nuclear test ban agreement only if we accept the eight-nation memorandum as the exclusive basis for negotiations --- I may interpolate that the simultaneous interpretation this morning gave one to understand that it was to be "the" basis for negotiations.

If I understood the Soviet representative this morning correctly from the simultaneous translation, he said that this was not his intention. Indeed, we welcome this clarification as far as it goes. We are still not very clear about this -- perhaps it is due to the simultaneous interpretation --- because after he had said that it was not to be the exclusive basis for negotiation, he still posed the question whether we accepted it as the basis for negotiations. In this

(Mr. Dean, United States)

connexion I should point out that the sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum apparently view their suggestions in the same way as my delegation does; this has already been pointed out by the United Kingdom representative.

In the final paragraph of the eight-nation memorandum they "urge the nuclear Powers earnestly to consider the suggestions put forward above, as well as other possible suggestions" (ENDC/28, page 2). This is precisely the way that my delegation will approach this memorandum in future negotiations. I say with great respect to the eight new members of the Conference that in studying the memorandum we believe that it contains certain ambiguous and vague passages. The Soviet representative spent considerable time this morning in dealing with the last sentences of paragraphs 4 and 5. I do not wish to go into any detailed interpretation of the document, but the last sentence of paragraph 4 states: "... The parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories", and the last sentence of the first part of paragraph 5 states: "The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above ...". Thus it is not precisely clear to me what the document means here. In posing our questions we tried to demonstrate that the memorandum was far from clear to us. Indeed, the Soviet statement yesterday points out that not all the provisions of the memorandum "are equally clear" (ENDC/32, page 3). However, the Soviet statements in this Committee yesterday morning and in the Sub-Committee yesterday afternoon seemed to us to go on to interpret the memorandum essentially in their own way. If one reads the verbatim record of the Sub-Committee meeting yesterday this seems to be very clear.

If the Soviet Union adheres to this interpretation of the joint memorandum, my delegation does not believe that the possibilities of agreement are at all encouraging. My delegation has made it clear on numerous occasions that we believe that the obligatory character of on-site inspection of an unidentified event within the control and discretion of the international control commission must be clearly provided for in the agreement. We submit that this cannot be left to a mere invitation, since no government which had, in fact, violated an agreement by conducting secret weapon tests would invite inspection.

As is known, my delegation submitted a list of questions (ENDC/29) regarding the eight-Power memorandum. The representative of Ethiopia stated (ENDC/24, page 5)

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the position of the sponsors of the memorandum with regard to these questions. While that statement did not by any manner of means clear up our questions, my delegation finds it entirely satisfactory and logical. However, the questions that we presented are still with us and would have to be among those to be considered in future negotiations on the joint memorandum. We would not, by acquiescing in the Soviet interpretation and by accepting the joint memorandum as so interpreted as the necessarily exclusive or even first basis for future negotiations, deprive ourselves of the opportunity to pursue the points implicit in the questions we have put.

Let me be quite clear: we are quite prepared to explore and study this memorandum as one of the bases for discussion, along with the other proposals now before the Conference and proposals which might be put forward in future negotiations, but not as an exclusive basis. As a matter of fact this process has already begun. By a decision of the Conference yesterday, upon the suggestion of the representatives of Italy and India, the eight-nation joint memorandum was transmitted to the Sub-Committee on nuclear testing for study. We believe that this effectively takes care of the matter and we do not see any need for prolonged argument about it. The joint memorandum, therefore, will be one basis for discussion, along with other suggestions and proposals for future negotiations.

The second question put by the Soviet delegation was: Will the United States consent to undertake an obligation not to conduct nuclear explosions during the negotiations? The answer to this question is: No. The United States will not undertake such an obligation. I dealt with this question at length in my intervention in the meetings of the Conference and the Sub-Committee yesterday. The verbatim records of those meetings are available, and I do not believe I can add anything to what I said yesterday.

I am sorry, but the United States has learnt its lesson with regard to voluntary, unpoliced moratoria, which can be broken at will by the Soviet Union on any pretext it wishes to dream up. The United States has said in this Conference, any number of times, that it is prepared to forgo its next test series if an adequate and effective agreement has been signed before the series begins. The Soviet Union, unfortunately, has rejected the very basis of such an agreement in unambiguous terms, stating its opposition to the very principle of international verification, including on-site inspection. And if I understood

(Mr. Dean, United States)

the Soviet representative correctly this morning, he said again that the Soviet Union would not commit itself to the principle of obligatory on-site inspection within the discretion of a control commission; he said that that was merely one of the things we would have to discuss in our future negotiations. At least that is the way I understood that the Soviet representative stated the matter. If I misunderstood him I will be very happy to be corrected.

The only condition necessary for negotiation is a willingness by all concerned to reach a just, safeguarded treaty. We are ready to meet this condition and we are quite sure our United Kingdom colleagues are too. It remains only for the Soviet Union to make clear whether it seeks propaganda or progress.

We continue to hope that our future efforts will bear fruit. To the extent that the memorandum of the eight Powers -- along with the other proposals that are before the Conference or that may come before the Conference --- can contribute to this objective, that memorandum is indeed welcome. The United States is prepared to negotiate constructively and in good faith in order to determine what possibilities for agreement the new eight-Power initiative presents. In that respect, as I say, we welcome it.

However, the United States must insist upon a system that will truly deter violations because it will provide a reasonable chance of violators' being detected. We have been, and we will remain, reasonable as to the instrumentalities by which this objective will be achieved, but we are not prepared to abandon the objective itself. If I understood correctly the representative of the Soviet Union -- and perhaps I misunderstood him in the simultaneous interpretation -- he asked us if the United States accepted the eight-Power memorandum as a compromise basis for discussion. The answer is: We accept it as a basis for discussion, but not as the exclusive basis for discussion.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): We have listened with the closest attention to the reports which the three members of the Sub-Committee have given us on their meeting yesterday. I should like to thank them, especially as this meeting of the Sub-Committee was proposed by the Italian delegation. We sincerely regret it has not been possible to reach agreement at this stage in our discussion.

(Mr. Caviglletti, Italy)

The Italian delegation's position on the problem of nuclear tests is well known, but I should like to remind you of it very briefly. We are opposed to tests -- to all tests -- just as we are opposed to armaments and the arms race. We regard both as regrettable necessities for maintaining a balance of armaments and security, which are unstable and have been recently threatened by the Soviet tests.

Mr. Lall, the Indian representative, is right when he says that the question of nuclear tests concerns all peoples. But it must be added that the balance of armaments and collective security also concern all the peoples of the world, because this will be the basis on which peace is preserved, so long as general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world has not been achieved.

We consider that the basic element of any agreement on disarmament measures is international control; without it the indispensable mutual trust cannot be re-established. Hence international control is necessary for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Today, as in the past, I still have the impression, gained from previous discussions, that this fundamental view-point of ours is shared by the majority of the countries represented here. We should not be brought to a standstill by the wording of a document which is perhaps rather obscure, and which, as the Ethiopian representative told us yesterday, cannot be clarified by its authors, the mens legis, is very important; and in this case I am sure that the authors sincerely wished to facilitate agreement.

One question that arises is whether the text could not be amended or clarified by the authors themselves, now that they have seen the difficulties that have arisen and how favourably their attempt at conciliation has been received by all delegations. It is a question of finding, with goodwill, an appropriate formula which would exclude from international control any possibility of espionage, which we all reject. We have not been able to find this formula yet, but the Italian delegation has not lost hope that it may be found later and is confident that the eight-nation memorandum can make a valuable contribution to the drafting of an agreement.

The tone of yesterday's discussion was perhaps a little sharp, which will not facilitate the drafting of an agreement at present. As Mr. Segni, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointed out in his statement on 16 March (ENDC/PV.3, page 13), we are not here to engage in mutual recrimination, but to

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

make an honest effort to reach an agreement that will guarantee our safety in a new world. The tone of certain statements and the polemics yesterday were not in harmony with the atmosphere of this Conference, which has hitherto been characterized by mutual goodwill, thanks to which we have achieved our first agreements, the great value of which I have already stressed.

Moreover, the existence of two full drafts on general and complete disarmament is a very encouraging factor, despite the difficulties facing us today.

We are going to adjourn for a few days. This will give us an opportunity for reflexion, and I have no doubt that after this short interruption we shall resume our work with new fervour and increased goodwill, and that in a less strained atmosphere we shall then be able to find solutions which escape us for the moment and which will meet our basic requirements. That is the feeling the Italian delegation wished to express today, in face of the difficulties confronting our Committee.

Mr. LALL (India): I know that there are no names on the list of speakers at the moment. I should prefer to speak after the three nuclear Powers have spoken again, if they wish to do so, and I should like now to ask them whether they do wish to speak again.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Far be it from me to keep from us the pearls of wisdom which I know will come from the representative of India, to whom we are all waiting to listen. I only want to make one further very brief comment.

I thought it was important that our position should be clarified, and that is what I sought to do in my intervention this morning. I only want to clear up one point, following on Mr. Zorin's speech this morning. At one stage in his speech he seemed to indicate that I myself had, as he put it, shown some slight movement forward this morning because I had agreed to consider the eight-Power memorandum as a basis. Merely to have the record straight, I should like it to be clear that that was exactly what I said yesterday morning when I spoke directly after Mr. Zorin. At that time I said:

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"I am perfectly willing to continue those negotiations using as a basis these proposals which have been put forward" ... (ENDC/PV.24, page 13).

I made that immediate response to him yesterday, which makes me all the more puzzled as to why he has tried to build this up into such a dramatic affair. It seems to me to be wholly illogical that one should do so. I made it clear then, and I repeated yesterday afternoon when I spoke, that I was perfectly willing to use the memorandum as a basis. I have clarified that to my utmost extent this morning, and that is the position. Therefore I hope we shall be able in our Sub-Committee to have further discussions in which we shall take full account of this valuable and interesting proposal.

However, all I was seeking to do was to be quite clear as to the position of the Soviet Union, because for the reasons I gave earlier this morning it seemed to me it could not be facing both ways. You cannot accept the principle of on-site inspection, which as I understand it, is implicit in the eight-Power document, and at the same time say that you are not going to have any form of control. Mr. Zorin at one stage this morning repeated: "We do not and shall not accept this position of yours on inspection" (Supra, page 17). Those are the words I took down this morning. If he means that he will accept some form of international on-site inspection, then that will be a step forward. That was exactly what I was seeking to clarify yesterday, both morning and afternoon, in my questioning. But when he refused to give me answers as to whether he had in fact moved away from the 28 November statement, when he refused to tell me whether he had moved away from the statement of Premier Khrushchev which he read to us only last Monday, then I was bound to assume that he was relying on the flexible wording of the eight-Power memorandum in paragraphs 4 and 5 to release him from any such obligations. However, I quite agree that these are matters which we can refer to again in the Sub-Committee, and I am perfectly ready to do so.

Perhaps I might take just one other point Mr. Zorin made this morning, the point about who was being flexible and who was being rigid. He talked about taking up extreme positions and he claimed that the Soviet Union was ready to compromise. If it is so ready, then I am very happy, but in this context perhaps I could refer my colleagues to the verbatim record of yesterday afternoon's discussions. Perhaps, following a distinguished example this morning, I might be

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

privileged to read out a fairly long extract from my own speech yesterday afternoon. I understand the validity of the desire of my Soviet colleague to do so earlier this morning; as he pointed out, our other colleagues around the table have not had very long to study the record. Perhaps I could read out a fairly substantial extract which I felt then -- as I feel now -- was rather important. I said:

"It seems to me that we have two extreme positions here. We have the position set out in the experts' report of 1958 on which we all based our discussions up until 28 November 1961. The experts' report of 1958 laid down that every disputed event should be inspected, that every event of which there was not certainty should be inspected. That is at one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale are the Soviet Union proposals of 28 November 1961 that no event should be inspected under any circumstances. If one accepts that these are the two extreme positions, then anything between those two positions is a compromise. If there is to be an agreement between us, it is quite clear that it has to be based on a compromise of some sort." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 5)

I went on to say:

"As I understood it, the proposals of our eight non-aligned colleagues were intended as a compromise, a compromise between those two clearly defined positions. If they are a compromise, then by definition, as I have tried to set out, they must imply some on-site inspection. And indeed that is what I read into the proposal put forward by the eight non-aligned nations. It was in order to clarify that very fact that I, and I think my United States colleague too, asked certain questions. But we understood the position of our non-aligned colleagues. We certainly do not wish to embarrass them. They have tried genuinely to find common ground. We quite understand that they prefer to rest on the document as it is. That being so, we have to define quite clearly, what this document means, as we interpret it. I am seeking to do just that; I am seeking to get a clear interpretation of it and I am seeking to get a clear interpretation also of the Soviet representative's statement this morning." (ibid., pages 5-6).

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

That exactly set out my position then and it sets out my position now. So I think it is clear where there is a willingness to compromise and where there is not. I hope that what our Soviet colleague has said this morning indicates that he is willing to reach a compromise. If he is, then we shall be able to make progress. But I have made it quite clear earlier this morning, just as I have tried to do in the past, where my delegation stands on this matter.

I am only too happy to find grounds to make progress, and I hope that we shall in our Sub-Committee be able to make further progress. However, we shall want to study yet again what has been said this morning. Perhaps that may facilitate our discussions; I hope that it will. I want to say nothing which will prevent further discussion, because I think it is only through this further discussion that we are going to solve our problems. I did think it important that before we departed for a short break everyone should know precisely where my delegation stood.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I wish to speak because we have reached a very important stage in our discussion. We asked for a plenary meeting of the Committee, and all its members wish to see what results we can achieve. I should like to make a few remarks on behalf of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

We listened with the closest attention the reports given us on yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee. We note with regret that no agreement was reached on the adoption of the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for further negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. I say "as a basis", not "as the basis" or "as the sole basis"; I repeat "as a basis". What then is the situation after the Sub-Committee's meeting? In the light of what was said at yesterday's plenary meeting and what has been said this morning I will take the liberty of summing it up, as seen by the Bulgarian delegation.

The problem of concluding an agreement on the final discontinuance of nuclear tests was referred to the Sub-Committee more than a month ago. During the negotiations two arguments, two positions, were opposed to each other. My delegation has had occasion to express its views on this subject and I will not repeat them. In brief, the Sub-Committee's work failed to produce the results we were entitled to expect and -- which is a serious matter --- its negotiations

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

reached a deadlock. It was at this point that, after strenuous efforts, the eight nations intervened, and on 16 April submitted the memorandum we examined yesterday.

The proposals of the eight non-aligned nations were submitted to facilitate negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests for ever. According to the opinion expressed by those nations, their proposals were intended to provide a fresh starting point, a new basis for negotiation, in order that the nuclear tests planned by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Pacific -- and other tests -- might not take place. At the end of the memorandum it is in fact stated that the eight nations --

"... urge the nuclear Powers earnestly to consider the suggestions put forward above, ... so as to save humanity from the evil of further nuclear tests." (ENDC/28, page 2)

As we heard at yesterday morning's meeting, the Soviet Union gave a clear and definite reply, a categorical reply, in a solemn declaration by its Government. In that declaration, the Soviet Union Government accepts the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned nations as a basis for negotiating a solution of this problem.

As the Soviet representative very pertinently pointed out at the same meeting, the Soviet Government accepts as a basis for further discussion a proposal put forward not by the Soviet group itself or, of course, by the Western countries, but by all the non-aligned countries which are members of the Eighteen Nation Committee.

The delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, also this morning, gave a negative though involved reply to the proposals contained in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries. They reaffirmed the intransigent position on nuclear tests which they have taken since the opening of the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In spite of all the declarations of goodwill with which they have showered our deliberations since the beginning of the discussion on tests, in spite of their statements that they would be willing to adopt a flexible attitude towards this question, they have so far opposed the new proposals of the eight non-aligned nations. As in the past, they are making every effort to appear in the most favourable light possible. Only this morning, we witnessed such efforts by the United Kingdom representative and, in particular, by the representative of the United States.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In his statement of 20 March 1962, Lord Home, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:

"..We are ready to negotiate any proposal which has the adequate minimum machinery of verification, and we are flexible and ready for compromise." (ENDC/PV.5, page 11).

I repeat, "flexible and ready for compromise". Similar statements have subsequently been made by the United Kingdom delegation, all of which were intended to show the allegedly intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union and the allegedly flexible attitude of the Western Powers. Such statements were made mainly in order to allay the fears and dissatisfaction of the delegations of the non-aligned countries at the discussion and the negotiations on nuclear tests being held up by unduly rigid attitudes.

In his statement at the meeting on 4 April, Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative said:

"I would merely say on behalf of the United Kingdom that I shall be very glad to continue our discussions as suggested by the representatives of India and Ethiopia." (ENDC/PV.15, page 32)

He went on to say:

"I hope very much that we may find some way of making progress..."

And at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which followed immediately on 5 April, Mr. Godber again attempted to throw the blame for lack of progress in the negotiations on to the other side. In an attempt to shift the responsibility on to others, and to allay the justifiable fears of the delegations at the Eighteen Nation Conference and of the world, Mr. Godber solemnly declared:

"I have said many times that we are flexible. I have pointed out that we have had no response." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.6, page 11)

No response from whom? From the Soviet Union, of course. He went on to say:

"I think that it is now up to the Soviet Union to consider afresh the various arguments brought forward by independent countries in our discussions this week -- arguments of which I have reminded the representative of the Soviet Union again in what I have just been saying." (ibid.)

(Mr. Tarabanev, Bulgaria)

We see now that the Soviet Union has considered the arguments advanced by the non-aligned countries in their interventions and set forth in the document submitted on 16 April in the form of a memorandum intended to serve as a basis for a compromise solution in the negotiations on nuclear tests (ENDC/28).

The Soviet Union has responded to the appeal of the non-aligned countries to consider their compromise proposals. In its statement of 19 April, presented at yesterday's plenary meeting by the Soviet representative, the Soviet Government said:

"For its part, the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set out in the memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations." (ENDC/PV.24, page 10)

I repeat, 'as a basis'. Today we have had quite a controversy here, despite the appeal not to engage in semantic exercises made by the United Kingdom representative who, in order to demonstrate the logic of his argument, immediately proceeded to engage in them. Moreover, the United States representative immediately began discussing whether the memorandum was to be a basis or the sole basis. But he did not use the words 'as a basis', as though in English there were no words to translate the phrase 'en tant que base'. But there are. I do not know English, but I might perhaps suggest simply 'as basis'. There was no need to look very far to find those words, but no attempt was made to do so.

We are being told that the discussion should be on only one of the bases. But in that case, what is the other? If there are several bases, there is no discussion. If you start from several bases, you have a battle -- you have contradiction. The idea is to take the memorandum as a basis and to submit -- whenever it is necessary, of course -- new proposals, and new suggestions to advance the discussion. Thus the memorandum should be taken as a basis and not as one of the bases.

I continue to quote the Soviet Union Government's statement:

"Thus the Soviet Government gives a positive answer to the appeal of the Governments of the States sponsoring the joint memorandum and will continue its efforts to achieve as quickly as possible an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests for ever." (ibid.)

(Mr. Tarabarov, Bulgaria)

Thus the Soviet Union has given a favourable reply to the request of the non-aligned countries, the joint memorandum of which presented yesterday by Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, who said;

"But it would be useless" --- meaning the memorandum, the compromise proposals submitted by the non-aligned countries -- "if it were not considered and accepted as a basis for negotiations within the shortest possible time". (ENDC/PV.24, page 6)

This is an exact quotation from the statement made yesterday by Mr. Sahlou expressing the thought of the non-aligned nations.

The Soviet Union has acceded to their request for a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the joint memorandum. As we said yesterday, it has given a clear, definite and positive reply which satisfies not only the non-aligned countries represented here, but all the other delegations which are making constant efforts to arrive at a solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It satisfies world opinion and the demand of all the peoples of the world that the nuclear explosions which are now the basis of the arms race should cease once and for all.

In these circumstances the following question arises: What is the reply of the Western Powers to the request of the non-aligned countries that the memorandum they have submitted be taken as a basis for negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests? It is not to the Soviet Union that they must answer whether they accept the memorandum and the compromise solutions put forward by the non-aligned nations. It is, of course, to the non-aligned nations and to public opinion as a whole that they must answer.

It is not a Soviet proposal that we are discussing now, but a proposal by the non-aligned countries. It is not, of course, a proposal by the Western Powers either; but since those Powers declare that they are willing to be flexible and to seek a compromise solution, they should take a position at once on the compromise proposals submitted by the non-aligned nations, which reflect a new spirit, and which, according to Mr. Dean himself in his statement yesterday, represent:

"... a new approach which might, hopefully, eventually bridge the gap between the Soviet and the Western positions on a nuclear test ban."

(ENDC/PV.24, page 15)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

But why "eventually" -- that is to say, in an inderterminate future? Why not now, when the need is greatest? Do the Western Powers intend to accept the non-aligned countries' proposals -- which, to use the Western Powers' own words, represent a new approach to the problem -- one day in the future, when they have completed the atomic explosions they intend to set off, their series of nuclear tests? Is that the flexibility they have been telling us about throughout the Conference? Do they wish to manoeuvre right up to the moment when they have completed their explosions, which threaten the world with a new and still more dangerous nuclear arms race? If that is their flexibility and spirit of compromise, they will only have served the shabby interests of certain circles which seek to speed up the arms race.

We have heard the Western Powers take the same position in their statements today. They are not prepared to accept the joint memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned nations as a basis for discussion, because they do not want a basis for discussion; they want several bases for discussion which they can interchange. Well, under those conditions there will be no discussion. The Western Powers wish to be able to accept the memorandum one day in the future. What day? In two months; in three months? When they have finished their nuclear tests? Do they think that they can promote disarmament in that way? Will the Western Powers then have achieved that balance of armaments which the President of the United States -- though that is not how some delegations describe it here -- has told us he is seeking? But, it is not armaments that guarantee peace; it is disarmament.

In the circumstances, we consider that the Western Powers should take the necessary steps to be able to submit now, in a few days, proposals and views that will enable our Conference to continue its fruitful work. We are not here to insist more or less violently on this or that view; it is simply a matter of facing up to the truth.

If the Western Powers manoeuvre until they can proceed with their nuclear tests, we think that the international situation will have deteriorated so much that there will then be little chance of achieving general and complete disarmament or the discontinuance of nuclear tests. On the contrary, the arms race will be resumed immediately; and that is why I think we should press the point now and at our coming meetings, before it is too late. It is necessary to take a clear

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

and definite position on the proposals submitted by the eight non-aligned countries with a view to finding a new basis for the discussions on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. That is important. There is still time to do it, but it will soon be too late.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have, first of all, a brief comment on the second statement made by the United Kingdom representative. He referred to my remark about his having shown some slight movement forward to day as compared with yesterday when he stated that he is prepared to accept the eight-nation memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations. He referred to his statement of yesterday to prove that he said the same thing then. He quoted the passage of his statement which referred to this matter. I am a careful sort of person and also looked up what Mr. Godber said yesterday morning. He quoted that passage, but, as so often happens with members of parliament, he did not finish the quotation. I am sorry, but this is a fact. Mr. Godber yesterday said:

"... I am perfectly willing to continue these negotiations, using as a basis these proposals which have been put forward..." (ENDC/PV.24 page 13)

He ended the quotation at this point, whereas the text continues:

"... assuming that the principles to which I have referred this morning are accepted" (ibid).

But this, to put it mildly, is a slight addition. I think everyone here has reached years of discretion and understands that this does not coincide with what he said today. Today he simply said that he is prepared to accept this as one of the bases. He made no reference at all to any conditions in this connexion.

I should like to hope that this is a step forward. Mr. Godber is anxious to assure us that it is not a step forward. He, of course, knows best, because he is the author of the statement, not I. But if he considers that he has not taken a step forward, I can only express my regret. I had hoped that this was nevertheless a step forward. If Mr. Godber considers that he still stands by his inflexible position of yesterday morning, this of course worsens the prospects for achieving a favourable solution of the whole problem. I think that, as our negotiations proceed, we follow the normal procedure of re-reading what we said yesterday and looking at what we said

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

today; tomorrow we shall reflect on what we said today and yesterday. I should like the United Kingdom representative and his Government to give serious thought to the situation that has arisen, and I should like to express the hope, although it has been considerably damped by yesterday's statements and by some reticences today, that the United Kingdom Government will adopt a more positive position than it did both yesterday and today on the question of the memorandum of the eight States.

My second remark concerns the actual meaning of the statement that the memorandum submitted by the eight States will form the basis of our further negotiations. I have no intention of attempting to interpret the ideas on which the document itself is based or the motives which actuated the delegations that assumed the difficult, but to my mind rewarding, task of working out some new compromise proposals. I should, however, like to refer to a statement which we heard yesterday and which was an expression of their common opinion. Yesterday Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, made a statement from a written text, a statement which I believe reflects the common viewpoint of all the eight States that participated in drawing up this document, particularly as Mr. Sahlou specifically stated that he was speaking on behalf of the eight delegations. I looked to see what Mr. Sahlou said at the end of his statement. He said on behalf of the eight States:

"Such tests ..." (he was speaking of the forthcoming nuclear weapon tests)
"are clearly in contradiction of the avowed aims of the nations
participating in the Disarmament Conference."

"We are, however, aware that the spiralling of test series can be broken only if there is the political will to break it and if there is a common basis for negotiation. We do not doubt that this exists, and we hope that the joint memorandum, as it stands, with the difficulties it presents as regards substance, may nevertheless serve as such a basis
(ENDC/24, page 6).

This is what the representatives of the eight States said. And the following further statement was made on behalf of the representatives of the eight States:

"But it would be useless if it were not considered and accepted as a basis for negotiations within the shortest possible time. Thus we reiterate our hope that the United States, the Soviet Union and the

(Mr. Zorin, USSE)

United Kingdom will find it profitable and possible to enter into immediate, new and constructive negotiations using the joint memorandum as a starting point." (ibid.)

That is what the eight States were proposing even before we spoke. They directed their hopes towards the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, urging us to enter into negotiations "using the joint memorandum as a starting point". The Soviet Union, to which this appeal was made by the representatives of the eight States, gave a positive answer to both these appeals. We are prepared to accept this memorandum as a basis for our negotiations, and we are prepared to accept it as a starting point for our negotiations.

If the representative of the United States does not like what we are proposing as a basis for negotiation, or if he considers it inadequate, then let him accept what the representatives of the eight States are proposing.

The United States has said that it does not wish to accept this as "an exclusive basis". It says it is prepared to accept it as "one of the bases" (Supra, page 21). The United Kingdom representative has associated himself with this view. Let us drop the word "exclusive" and the words "as one of the bases" and let us simply say that we accept it as a basis for negotiations and as a starting point for our negotiations. This is how the representatives of the eight States who have appealed to us have put it. We are prepared for negotiations on that basis.

I do not know what the reaction of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom will be, but it seems to us that this should not conflict with their position.

I noted, however, the short statement made by the representative of Italy today. In this statement he made a remark which I think cannot be allowed to pass without comment. He asked whether the authors could not amend their text and find a formula which would be more acceptable.

I noted this, because the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom said substantially the same in their statements. There are some things in the memorandum that they do not like. And the United States representative even mentioned the specific things he does not like. For instance, he said that he did not like what he described as "certain ambiguous and vague passages",

(Mr. Lorin, USSE)

especially in paragraph 5. He referred to the provision that inspection can be invited, and said that that was not clear to him. If the text of the paragraph really reflected the proposal, he said, it was unacceptable: matters could not be left to a mere invitation. That was the position taken by the United States representative. And when the United States says that it does not want to accept this proposal as a basis, or regards it as "one of the bases", the reason seems to be that it disagrees with some of the provisions contained in the memorandum, and in particular with the provisions mentioned in paragraph 5 and, apparently in paragraph 4 also.

In the Sub-Committee's meeting yesterday, Mr. Godber asked me how I interpreted paragraphs 4 and 5. I think I have adequately explained today how I interpret them. I interpret paragraphs 4 and 5 to mean what they say. But, judging from the statement of the United States representative, what paragraphs 4 and 5 say is unacceptable to the United States. That is the problem. That is why the Italian representative is so eager to help the representative of the United States in this difficulty. He asks whether it would not be possible for the sponsors to modify this text.

But, you see, if the representatives of the eight States were directly involved in our negotiations and were directly interested parties, such a request might have some justification. In other words, if you submit proposals for consideration, examine them yourselves and yourselves adopt decisions, then of course you can change your position from one day to the next. But why should such a request be addressed to countries which are not directly involved in the negotiations and which do not set out to provide ready-made solutions to the problem? It was not for this purpose that they introduced their proposal. As I understand it, their aim is not to provide a ready-made solution to the problem. They are submitting their proposal as a basis for negotiations, as a starting point for negotiations. This is what their proposal is.

Why then do you propose that they should modify their positions? Is it because they are not to your liking? Do you believe that we like all the suggestions contained in their proposal? We also do not like certain proposals. This is perfectly natural, because these proposals are a compromise between two points of view. But we are not asking that these points should be modified at this stage. What we are saying is that we accept the text as a basis for negotiations, as a starting point for negotiations; in other words, we are ready for a compromise.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In his second statement today the United Kingdom representative said that he had been encouraged when he had heard that the Soviet Union was ready to compromise. This is in fact the case. This is encouraging, since we are ready to reach agreement on the basis of a compromise. But we have also heard a statement by the United States representative today. What did he say?

He said that if it is a question of a compromise, the United States does not agree. This is what he said. This was said and is now written into the record. What does it mean? Is it really an encouraging statement? No, this statement is not only discouraging and disappointing, but gives rise to concern about the possibility of reaching agreement. Because if one side is ready to accept a compromise basis while the other side announces that it is not prepared to do so, what outcome can the negotiations have?

I believe that all those who are not conducting negotiations on behalf of their States for the first time know very well where this may lead. Two positions are clearly in evidence here. One position is that of the Soviet Union -- a position genuinely aimed at agreement, at finding a compromise solution to this question, at reaching agreement on a mutually-acceptable basis. And the other position, which has been particularly clearly expressed by Mr. Dean, amounts to saying: "Compromise -- never!" That is the situation. It of course is a situation which cannot inspire optimism; it can only give grounds for concern, since if one side is prepared to accept a compromise basis for the negotiations and the other side says that it will not accept such a compromise basis, then the prospects for our negotiations are naturally bleak.

Now let everyone taking part in our negotiations judge, let all the world judge, with whom the blame lies if we do not reach agreement: with those who are prepared to accept a compromise basis, or with those who say "No compromises". I believe that there can only be one answer to this question. It is obvious that those who want no compromise do not want an agreement. This is the only conclusion which the peoples can draw from a sober examination of the actual situation which has arisen at the present time.

However, the Soviet Union has consistently adopted, is adopting and will continue to adopt a policy of reaching agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests on a mutually-acceptable basis. We have responded to the wishes that have been expressed in this Conference room and throughout the world.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We are prepared to accept a compromise basis for the negotiations, one proposed not by ourselves but by the eight non-aligned States. We are prepared to take these proposals as a starting point for the negotiations, as suggested in the statement by the representative of these eight States. We are prepared for negotiation on this basis with a view to achieving such a mutually-acceptable agreement. If the United States and the United Kingdom are ready for such negotiations, let us embark upon them. We will continue these negotiations. We will try to achieve a possible agreement, and we believe that such an agreement can be reached on a compromise basis.

However, I must point out that all this may be frustrated if the United States and the United Kingdom do not listen to the voice of all the peoples, the voice of all those who have spoken in the Committee, and start nuclear tests.

The statement by the Soviet Government which I read out yesterday (ENDC/32, page 4) states quite clearly that "fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests cannot be conducted to the sound of nuclear weapon tests". Let all those who are responsible for the policy of their governments give heed to everything which has been said here, to what is being said throughout the world at the present moment and to what is said in the statement by the Soviet Government.

We continue to hope that the voice of reason will prevail and that the United States and the United Kingdom will embark on the road to agreement on prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time. If they do not do so, the responsibility for the subsequent course of events will rest with them.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Mr. Zorin, at the opening of his last remarks, referred to me and to the habits of members of parliament. There are times when I could wish that Mr. Zorin himself had had a parliamentary career. I think it might have been helpful. The truth is that, in some countries anyway, parliamentarians are not quite so polite as representatives who sit round a conference table, because they get to know when one of their colleagues is in the habit of making long and repetitive speeches, and when he does so they tend to get up and go out for a drink. This is a thought which I would merely leave with my Soviet colleague at this stage.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

On the point which he raised in regard to my own previous intervention, I apologize once more if I did not quote myself at sufficient length for my Soviet colleague, but I am always somewhat anxious not to overdo quoting myself. There is no real significance in the fact that I did not go on, unless Mr. Zorin wishes to read significance into it, and that is what I am not clear about.

It is perfectly true that I qualified my remark by referring to the principles which I had mentioned. But what were those principles? They were three; they were simple ones, and ones which I thought were inherent in the document. I said:

"First, it seems to me that these new proposals do accept the principle of an international network of detection posts." (ENDC/PV.24, page 12)

I will quote further if Mr. Zorin wishes, but I do not wish to bore my colleagues. That was the first principle I laid down, as I interpreted the document.

The second principle I referred to in these words:

"Secondly, it did seem to us that the memorandum accepted the principle of the establishment of an international body ..." (*ibid.*)

Again I could quote further, but I do not think it would be relevant. That was the second principle, and I should have thought it was inherent in the text.

The third principle to which I referred is as follows:

"Then, of course, there is the vital question of inspection.

Here it seemed to us that the memorandum did accept the principle of international inspection ..." (*ibid.*)

I should have thought those principles were inherent in the document. Therefore, if Mr. Zorin does not think they are inherent in the document, that is indeed an important statement. However, I should have thought they were inherent in the document, and therefore my willingness to use them as a basis for discussion stands.

However, in order to reassure Mr. Zorin further, I would note that yesterday afternoon in the meeting of the Sub-Committee he must have heard me say in my first intervention:

"We ourselves are, of course, ready to discuss in this Sub-Committee the important proposition of the eight non-aligned countries. We are anxious to do so ..." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 4)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I repeated that later, and again and again. So really there is no substance in all this talk about whether we are willing to accept it, and on what conditions we are willing to accept it. We are willing to accept and talk about this. That was the intention, as I understood it, of the eight neutral States when they brought the matter up. This was their intention in bringing it forward -- not to be restrictive, but to help us forward in our discussions. It is on that basis that I have willingly agreed to discuss it. I can only repeat that willingness now as I have repeated it earlier. I hope that that will reassure my Soviet colleague.

I will not be tempted into commenting further on the other matters. I think I have already made the United Kingdom position abundantly clear, and I apologize for intervening yet again.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I think that in my earlier statement this morning I made the position of my Government abundantly clear. I have never at any time said that the United States is not willing to discuss a compromise. In fact I have said any number of times that we are quite prepared and quite willing to discuss the basic treaty which we drafted and submitted to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 18 April 1961 (EMDC/9) and which was based fundamentally upon the Geneva experts' report; that, as long as the basic principles of control as outlined in the Geneva experts' reports of 1956 (EXP/NUC/28) and 1959 (GEN/DNT/HAT/8, TWG2/9) were included in such a treaty, we were quite open-minded about the instrumentalities.

I think I have made it abundantly clear that we welcome this memorandum of the eight nations. In my earlier statement this morning, merely by way of illustration, I referred to two points in the memorandum that are not clear to me. I think the questions I have posed earlier make it clear that there are other points in the memorandum that are not clear to me. Perhaps it is a difference between the English language and the Russian language, or the lack of definite articles in the Russian language; I do not know. But I submit that we ought not to waste an enormous amount of time on the question whether we are going to take a document that has been submitted to the Conference as "a basis" or as "the basis", which means in English "exclusive basis", when the substance of what I have said is that we are quite prepared to study the eight-Power memorandum and to consider it as one of the bases but not the exclusive basis.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom).

I do not see how I could be any clearer than that, and I do not see how it is going to help us to get into semantics, to talk about words or about grammar, or about definite articles or the lack of definite articles. I say that, as a matter of substance, we are quite prepared to continue these negotiations. We are quite prepared to spend all the time necessary with our Soviet colleagues or with any other members of the Conference. I will make myself available at any time for negotiations on this matter, and we are quite prepared to continue them. I want it to be very clear that I did not say that I would not accept any compromise. I have learned that the representative of the Soviet Union takes agreements very literally. We had an agreement with respect to the work of our Conference, and we have been spending an enormous amount of time since then on the grammatical construction of that agreement, on whether we can take up in the Committee of the Whole matters which are mentioned in one or more of the draft treaties. I submit that that kind of grammatical discussion is quite profitless. I do not want to get into that kind of profitless grammatical discussion again. I want to proceed to a discussion of the substance. I am quite prepared to discuss the substance of the eight-Power memorandum.

M. Lorin at one point --- or at least so it came over in the interpretation --- said he asked me whether I accepted the memorandum as the compromise or whether I accepted it as the starting point. Let me say again that I am quite prepared to study it. I am quite prepared to consider it. I do not understand the memorandum in its present form. There are parts of the memorandum that are far from clear to me. I do not want to be in the position, when we are negotiating in the Sub-Committee, of not being able to discuss anything for the next three months except what is in the eight-Power memorandum. I think we should be free to discuss anything in the Sub-Committee or in this Conference with respect to this question of nuclear testing.

I wish it to be clear that, within the limits of the principles of control laid down in the Geneva experts' report of 1958 and 1959, which are outlined in our treaty --- we also outlined there our thoughts on the outer-space and underwater environments; but those are complicated questions that I will not go into now --- I am prepared to discuss any reasonable compromise. I do not want the representative of the Soviet Union to put into my mouth words which I did not use.

Mr. LALL (India): I am sure all of us and, if I may say so, particularly the eight delegations that thought fit to bring a memorandum before this Committee --- a memorandum which we particularly gave to the three nuclear Powers --- have listened with the closest possible attention to what our colleagues have been saying today. If the other representatives will forgive me, I will say that we have listened particularly to what the three nuclear Powers have been saying though of course we have paid equal attention to the other statements.

May I first say --- I say this with the utmost sincerity and I feel I am echoing the feeling of many of us in this room --- that I think we can detect a new tone today, based on a sincere desire on both sides to try to come together and to find some basis for consideration of this matter? This is a most important point, and I say in this room to everyone that we are very glad to note the difference between today and yesterday in this particular regard.

Before I come to the matters directly germane to this issue, may I be permitted to mention a thought that occurs to me arising out of a point made by the representative of Italy? I am not quoting him, but he referred in effect to what can be stated briefly as the need to maintain a balance --- a military balance. I want to say here and now that my Government rejects the idea of a balance of terror as providing a basis of security for the world today. We reject this proposition entirely and fully. I must remind our colleagues that implicitly the leaders of the two great countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, have also rejected this position. Mr. Kennedy has said that in the building up of armaments there can no longer be security. We respectfully agree with that position of Mr. Kennedy. We cannot accept the view that this is a time in the history of mankind to put up the balance of terror on which our so-called extremely precarious, extremely dangerous security exists. So, with great respect, we reject that viewpoint entirely.

We are not here because there is a war on; we are not here because people are fighting; we are here precisely because there is this precarious, awful balance of terror today. We reject that position as being one in which the world can subsist or which can lead to further tests by either side today. We reject the suggestion that there can be any security, or any search for security, through nuclear tests, and I might add to say that this is the position of the leaders of the countries which are directly concerned.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I should now like to make a general remark about the question of compromise. I am very glad that Mr. Dean intervened again, because he made it clear, and he did so perfectly effectively, that the United States is willing to seek a reasonable compromise. I took down Mr. Dean as having said at the end of his statement -- of course I cannot quote him exactly, because one cannot do so when one speaks immediately after a statement -- "We are willing to discuss any reasonable compromise in this matter".

I believe that a more important and more significant statement on this essential business of compromise has been made by Mr. Godber. At yesterday's meeting of the Sub-Committee Mr. Godber said the following -- and he referred to it this morning:

"It seems to me that we have two extreme positions here. We have the position set out in the expert's report of 1958 on which we all based our discussions up until 28 November 1961. The experts' report of 1958 laid down that every disputed event should be inspected, that every event of which there was not certainty should be inspected. That is at one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale are the Soviet Union proposals of 28 November 1961 that no event should be inspected under any circumstance. If one accepts that these are the two extreme positions, then anything between these two positions is a compromise."

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 5)

Now I come to the most significant part of that statement: "If there is to be an agreement between us, it is quite clear that it has to be based on a compromise of some sort." I take this to mean that the United Kingdom Government is willing to find a compromise by departing from both extreme positions. That is clearly stated here, and I see Mr. Godber nodding, so that is what the Government of the United Kingdom means. That is a very important statement. Mr. Godber went on to say:

"As I understood it, the proposals of our eight non-aligned colleagues were intended as a compromise, a compromise between those two clearly-defined positions." (Ibid.)

I shall stop at this point in quoting Mr. Godber's statement. I want to say that I entirely agree with him in that interpretation of the joint memorandum submitted by the eight nations. I have not consulted my other seven colleagues -- they can also state whether they agree with this interpretation --; but I certainly say, with a full sense of responsibility, that I entirely agree with that statement of Mr. Godber. The joint memorandum is a compromise between these two clearly-defined positions.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Since both the representative of the United States and the representative of the Soviet Union have said today again that they are willing to look for a compromise, I refer them to Mr. Godber's statement that the joint memorandum is intended as a compromise, a compromise between two clearly-defined positions, which Mr. Godber himself has referred to as two extreme positions.

As I have said, we detect here a sincere effort to come together. I believe that what I have said establishes this. Before I draw attention to other statements that have been made today, may I again say that it would be a tragedy if this sincere effort to come together were not to fructify and if, instead, we were to return to a spiralling of weapons development? This might satisfy some as maintaining a balance of terror, but it does not satisfy us and it would not satisfy even those who might decide that that was the course upon which to embark.

May I now draw the attention of my colleagues to a few other statements which were made today? The representative of the Soviet Union asked, in referring to the joint memorandum: "Have we said that this should be the exclusive basis for negotiations?" I took him down as saying that he had not put that question, that his question was a more general one, namely, "Are you prepared to accept this document as the basis of discussion, that is, that the discussion should turn mainly round this document?" The interpreter used the word "Mainly" --- "Mainly round this document". Mr. Zorin said, "There may be other new proposals". Then he asked the question: "Can the old documents or proposals be used?" He said: "Of course they could be used". He said: "The crux of the matter is that there must be a starting point". He added that it was not in accordance with the position of the Soviet Union that the joint memorandum of the eight countries should be the exclusive document to be considered.

Now what did our other colleagues say? Mr. Godber said: "This document cannot be the exclusive basis. It cannot be the only basis. We must consider other possible suggestions as well." But he added that he could give his Soviet colleague the assurance that he would be only too happy and willing to discuss this question on the basis of this document, so long as it was not the exclusive basis. But this is also what Mr. Zorin has been saying. Then Mr. Dean said today that he welcomed the Soviet clarification that they did not mean the joint memorandum of the eight nations to be the exclusive basis for negotiations. He said that he was quite prepared to explore the joint memorandum as one basis for negotiations. He later said that he

(Mr. Lall, India)

was quite prepared to consider it but he did not understand it in its present form. Again, I have not consulted my seven colleagues, but I feel I should apologize to Mr. Dean, if we have presented a document which he does not understand. In all seriousness, I am sure that we would like to enter upon a discussion of our document so that it might be made more clear. We are restraining ourselves from doing so because we think it is premature to do so -- at least I believe it is premature. I think the time may come when we may be able to make this document clearer. I may say that if Mr. Dean would wish me or any of us to make this document more clear, we are at his service, but not now at this meeting -- in any case because it is 1.10 p.m., if for no other reason.

All three nuclear Powers have said through their representatives here today that they are willing to consider this document as a basis for discussion and to negotiate on that basis.

Incidentally, I was glad for another reason that Mr. Godber spoke again. Perhaps it was just how he was feeling about words, perhaps it had no significance at all -- sometimes people do have feelings about particular words on certain days. But today, I noted very carefully, he said in his statement that he would be willing to discuss matters on the basis of this document, but he never used the word "negotiation". As you see, he was indicating that it was merely one of those days. I am glad he spoke again, because he referred to his statement of yesterday. I will not read the whole of that statement. Although one of our colleagues has said that it is very bad parliamentary manners to read only such excerpts from statements as suit one, I will nevertheless follow that procedure and quote what suits me today from yesterday's proceedings, when Mr. Godber said:

"... I welcome that most warmly, because I myself am most anxious that we should continue our negotiations, and I am perfectly willing to continue those negotiations using as a basis these proposals which have been put forward ...". (ENDC/PV.24, page 13)

I will not read the remainder. I am very glad that Mr. Godber used the word "negotiations", because that is what is wanted. What we want now are urgent, sincere and constructive negotiations.

Perhaps the Committee will bear with me when I say this. Both sides have declared that they do not exclude other ideas, other suggestions, other documents, proposals new and old. I am now going to say something for myself. Of course

(Mr. Lall, India)

there have been previous proposals to try and break this deadlock. There have been previous ideas. In particular, there have been two positions which Mr. Godber has called two extreme positions, and these positions have failed to break the deadlock. I trust and sincerely hope that when the three delegations resume negotiations, taking as a basis this joint memorandum of ours -- and I feel they are going to take this as a basis and are going to resume negotiations -- they will not go back to either of their extreme positions.

In that connexion I want to refer to something Mr. Zorin said. He said: What does Mr. Godber mean by a basis? He added that if the old Western basis is to be reverted to, there is "no go" -- or words to that effect. I am not quoting the exact words but using my own notes. I would like to add this. My own view is that if there is "no go" on the basis of the old Western proposals, there is also "no go" on the basis of the Soviet proposals; there is "no go" on either of these bases, there is "no go" at all.

Let us be quite clear about this. Of course the eight delegations are not saying that only the document we have put forward should be discussed. In fact, we have said, in paragraph 6, that there may be other suggestions and ideas. Please discuss them, but, equally, please remember that there is "no go" on the basis of the two extreme positions. Mr. Godber has called them extreme positions. He said that a compromise must be found. Please do not go into these negotiations on the basis of those two extreme positions. Certainly, if you, the nuclear Powers, can find new suggestions, new ideas, on which there can be a "go", please by all means use them. No one would be happier than the very eight delegations who have formulated the memorandum, which they do think can be a valid basis for agreement.

I want to say with all seriousness that I am sure that if the three nuclear Powers give us the opportunity, when the time is right to do so, to clarify this document, they will find it to be a sincere, intelligent and statesmanlike basis for an agreement, the sort of agreement which Mr. Godber mentioned as being necessary, namely a compromise agreement. It is just that which our document offers. We shall be very glad if the nuclear Powers can find other constructive ideas, but please do not go back -- we beg you not to go back -- to the two extreme positions you have held hitherto. That will not take us to a solution, and, speaking for ourselves, we believe, for many other countries not represented here, we do feel it is urgent that an agreement be reached.

(Mr. Lall, India)

As I close, may I read again the last two sentences of the statement which our colleague from Ethiopia made here yesterday on behalf of the eight delegations:

"Thus we reiterate our hope that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom will find it profitable and possible to enter into immediate, new and constructive negotiations using the joint memorandum as a starting point. This is our hope and this is what we, the eight delegations, feel is the pertinent question. We pray for a speedy and positive answer and action." (ENDC/PV.24, pages 6 and 7)

We feel that the three nuclear Powers are now on the threshold of negotiations again, using the memorandum which we have presented to them. We wish them success in those negotiations. We request them to start the negotiations urgently and to try their very hardest to bring them to a successful conclusion. May we also say this to them, with great sincerity, that if they can bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion the world at large will thank each of the three delegations and countries. Please remember that while you will be negotiating among yourselves you will be negotiating something for which the world will be deeply grateful to you. Godspeed to all three of you.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): Before calling on the representative of the United Arab Republic, I call on the representative of Italy on a point of order.

Mr. CAVALIETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The representative of India, though he did not quote me, seemed to wish to make out that I was in favour of the balance of terror and the arms race. I said exactly the opposite. I said that we are opposed to the arms race, opposed to armaments and opposed to nuclear tests. I added that we are concerned for our own security and the security of the world, and I repeat that. I think I also said that we sincerely hope to establish by our efforts here a disarmed, peaceful world. Is that being in favour of the arms race and the balance of terror? I think the position of the Italian delegation is sufficiently clear now that I have again confirmed it.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): Difficult as it is for my delegation to make a statement, as a newcomer to this Conference I find it even more difficult when I have little or in fact very little to say. However, I find it my duty to put on the record a few remarks which my delegation thinks worth mentioning here.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Indeed, five weeks have elapsed and the gap between the different opinions has not been bridged or even minimized by the passing of time. But I must admit that we are not disillusioned or disappointed. We came here to this Conference with a spirit of hope and with a sincere intention of doing the best we can to make this Conference a success. It has never crossed our minds that success in such an important and vital matter is an easy thing to attain. On the contrary, we have predicted, and predicted rightly, that the Conference would be confronted with many problems. But that prediction, which in the past few days has proved to be right, never had any effect or influence on our sincere and striving efforts to work for the creation of a better world. This should not be taken in any way as an underestimation of the difficulty of the problems that confront us, nor is it a lack of understanding on our part of the importance of national security to both the East and the West.

My delegation fully understands and appreciates the critical situation of both the United States and the Soviet Union. But let us not forget that national security should not overshadow or override the peace of the world.

The representative of the United Kingdom, if I understood him rightly, said in one of our previous meetings something to the effect that he did not come here to debate but mainly to reach an acceptable treaty. How much I agree with that! It is not our task here to make speeches to one another, nor is it our task to accuse one another. It is our sacred task, if I may say so, to find a common basis for a common ground on which we can start taking positive steps towards the fulfilment of our noblest goals.

Perhaps it is that there are not very many fresh ideas. However, this could not possibly be an excuse or a fair justification for the failure of our Conference, because I am sure that if there is a will there is a way, and I am almost certain that we can find a way out. A meeting point must be reached if we are faithful and sincere in our hearts with regard to this matter.

It is indeed in this light that my delegation has viewed the ideas and suggestions submitted to the Conference by the non-aligned countries. My delegation does not want to consider this memorandum as conclusive. We still believe it is a genuine and sincere attempt that might provide the Conference with a starting point for better understanding. It is, indeed, in this connexion that I find myself in full agreement with what Mr. Lall said yesterday, to the effect that it would be a great pity and in fact a tragedy if this memorandum leads to widening the gap between the nuclear Powers rather than to narrowing it.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

The Government of the United Arab Republic, as one of the sponsors of the tabled memorandum, hopes that it will serve as a basis for further efforts and negotiations. Indeed, my delegation has studied with the utmost care the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union in the plenary meeting of 19 April. It is in fact with great pleasure that we welcome the Soviet Union's readiness for further negotiation on the basis of this joint memorandum.

Whether this memorandum is to be considered exclusively or with other proposals cannot be decided in advance and before it has been fully considered. Certainly, you have now heard the representative of the United States say that he does not quite understand it. Perhaps there will be no need for other documents -- or perhaps there will. Anyhow, this question, as I said before, cannot be decided in advance. This would be, in our opinion, premature. What concerns us here is that the memorandum be given prompt consideration. I hope it will be given an opportunity to serve its considered purpose as a point of departure and as a meeting ground for further progress.

Before closing, I feel in duty bound to repeat what has been several times stated by my delegation, that we are opposed to the resumption of any and all nuclear tests. It is in this connexion that I wish to recall the appeal made by my Government on 23 March at this Conference when my Foreign Minister said:

"We trust that in the meantime the four Governments which are principally and directly involved in this vital matter will come more into line with the feelings and convictions in this regard of all the peoples of the world and that they will actually, if not yet contractually, withhold any further nuclear weapon tests in order, among other things, to afford a better and wider scope for agreement than seems at the present moment to be available." (ENDC/PV.8, page 32)

Finally, I should like to repeat what we said yesterday, that we reiterate our hope that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom will find it profitable and possible to enter into immediate, new and constructive negotiations using the joint memorandum as a starting point. This is our hope, and we pray for a speedy and positive answer in action.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-fifth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. A.A. Atta, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, Italy, Bulgaria, India and the United Arab Republic.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 24 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.25/Corr.1
14 June 1962

ENGLISH only

THE UNIVERSITY
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PPS 6 1963

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CORRIGENDUM TO THE
FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

On Page 25: Replace the last sentence of the third paragraph by the following:

"We should not be brought to a standstill by the wording of a document which is perhaps rather obscure, and which, as the Ethiopian representative told us yesterday, cannot be clarified by its authors collectively. Nevertheless, in the interpretation of a text the intention of the authors, the mens legis, is very important; and in this case I am sure that the authors sincerely wished to facilitate agreement."

